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The views expressed by Germany’s iron chancellor on the Eastern question 
are justly notorious. Few students of diplomatic history have not heard 
Bismarck’s bon mot that “the entire Orient [den ganzen Orient] is not 
worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier” —  although many mis-
takenly believe that he was referring to the Balkans, full stop, rather than 
the Ottoman Empire in its entirety.1 Otto von Bismarck’s Machiavellian 
“Reinsurance Treaty” of 1887 even contained a clause promising that the 
Germans would remain neutral if the Russians again tried to seize Con-
stantinople as they nearly had in 1878. The chancellor’s dismissive view of 
Turkey’s strategic importance seems of a piece with his only slightly less 
famous disregard for Africa, expressed to the explorer Eugen Wolff: “my 
map of Africa lies in Europe. Here is Russia and here is France, and we 
[Germany] are in the middle; that is my map of Africa.”2
And yet, despite his supposed contempt for the Ottoman Empire and 
Africa, Bismarck presided over two Berlin congresses dealing with one and 
then the other, in 1878 and 1884. He not only went along with Germany’s 
acquisition of African colonies in the 1880s but also approved the dis-
patch of a German military mission at Sultan Abdülhamid II’s request in 
1882, which planted the potent seed of German influence in the Ottoman 
army. Germany’s famous investment in Ottoman strategic rail began in 
the Bismarckian, not the Wilhelmine, era: the first stretch of the Bagh-
dad Railway, from Istanbul to İzmit, was completed in 1872. The original 
Anatolian Railway Company was incorporated in 1889, while Bismarck 
was still in office.
What are we to make of Bismarck’s actual policies vis-à-vis the 
Ottoman Empire, which seem to contradict his public statements so 
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 blatantly? This paper argues that, far from dismissing Turkey’s strategic 
importance, Bismarck in fact felt it only too keenly. The key to the appar-
ent puzzle of Bismarck’s Ottoman policy is the vast gulf between what he 
saw as Ottoman Turkey’s minimal importance for Germany and its colos-
sal importance for other powers —  Austria, Russia, and France, which were 
themselves deeply entangled with Germany. (Britain, like Turkey itself, 
factored into German calculations only at second remove, via its rivalries 
with Russia and France.) Bismarck’s genius, and his curse, was to perceive 
sooner than anyone else the danger that a collapse of Ottoman authority 
in the Balkans would provoke a general European war. Preventing such a 
conflict was his overriding priority from the time of Germany’s unification 
in 1871 until his fall from power in 1890. It is thus not surprising that Bis-
marck’s most famous diplomatic triumph came at the Congress of Berlin 
in 1878, when he mediated a settlement that (for all its ugly horse-trading 
at Turkish expense) helped preserve the Ottoman Empire —  and the peace 
of Europe —  for a quarter-century.
Unlike his encouragement of German imperialism in Africa, which 
truly was cynical, following the Berlin Conference Bismarck quietly but 
genuinely promoted the expansion of German influence in Turkey. His 
goal was to shore up its defenses in order to ward off the predatory inten-
tions of other powers. To do this while not alarming Austria and Russia — 
France could easily exploit another eastern crisis to attack Germany —  was 
a difficult but not impossible task for Bismarck’s unsentimental Realpoli-
tik. It proved beyond the abilities of Kaiser Wilhelm II, whose sentimental 
attachment to the Ottoman Empire paradoxically led him to become an 
unwitting catalyst in its destruction.
To understand Bismarck’s Ottoman policy at the Berlin Conference of 
1878, it is necessary to examine his actions during the Balkan crisis that 
led up to it. From what we know of the diplomatic fallout of the Berlin 
Treaty —  Russia’s notorious resentment at the overturning of its own vic-
torious Treaty of San Stefano with the Ottomans, a “defeat” that many in 
St. Petersburg blamed on Bismarck —  we might expect that the chancel-
lor had discouraged Russia from intervening.3 This, however, is quite far 
from the case. Bismarck in fact initially greeted the news of unrest in the 
Balkans in 1875 as a welcome distraction from what he saw as an unhealthy 
obsession in Europe’s chancelleries with the Franco-German question (it 
is noteworthy that Bismarck himself, fearing just this, had not wanted to 
annex Alsace-Lorraine in 1871: he was overruled by the military). In much 
the same way in which he would later encourage colonial gamesmanship in 
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the “Scramble for Africa” to keep France embroiled with Britain, Bismarck 
believed that a Balkan crisis could lead to closer relations with London at 
France’s expense. For this reason, after the first rumblings of an Ottoman 
crisis in 1875 —  the Bosnian uprising in the summer and the Porte’s default 
on debt interest payments in October —  Bismarck offered Germany’s un-
prompted endorsement of Britain’s buyout of the Suez  Canal company in 
November 1875 and instructed Lord Odo Russell, Britain’s ambassador, to 
propose a sweeping agreement on Balkan issues to British prime minister 
Benjamin Disraeli. The territorial details of this would-be settlement, Ger-
many’s chancellor informed Disraeli, mattered not at all: the powers could 
agree on either the maintenance of the status quo on Ottoman Europe or 
its ruthless partition: the important thing was that the powers reach an 
agreement on “what was to be done with Turkey.”4
During the entire Balkan crisis that unfolded, Bismarck’s basic posi-
tion of disinterest toward territorial changes never wavered. With remark-
able prescience (and a dose of his famous cynicism) Bismarck’s “offer” to 
Disraeli in January 1876 anticipated the basic Balkan settlement reached 
two years —  and two wars —  later, with Russian gains in Bessarabia offset 
by Austrian control of (though not sovereignty over) Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Whether Russia went to war with Ottoman Turkey or not was a matter of 
equal indifference to Bismarck: in fact at one point in September 1876 he 
all but encouraged St. Petersburg to attack, so long as this was done with 
Austrian approval.5 It was not that Bismarck particularly desired either 
the preservation of Ottoman territorial integrity or its violent dismember-
ment through Russian aggression. In his view the principal German inter-
est, rather, lay in controlling the Balkan crisis so as to prevent the European 
powers from going to war with each other. Because the state he served 
had no natural frontiers offering a defense against invasion by any of the 
potentially hostile powers encircling its borders (France, Denmark, and 
Austria had all recently lost territory to Prussia/Germany), Bismarck was 
willing to pay almost any price to avoid diplomatic perturbations that 
might plunge Europe into war. As Lord Odo Russell explained Bismarck’s 
Ottoman policy to London in 1877, “suffice it to say that he is quite ready 
to divide Turkey for the sake of keeping Germany together.”6
To modern sensibilities, these episodes in Bismarckian Realpolitik 
seem brazen, if not downright offensive. What business was it of Ger-
many’s chancellor to broach plans for partitioning Ottoman Turkey be-
tween Austria and Russia —  to Britain’s prime minister? On what logical, 
let alone moral or ethical grounds, did third-party Bismarck presume 
the right to sanctify a Russian war of aggression mounted in the name 
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of “Christianity” against Muslim Turkey, adding only the condition that 
a fourth party, Austria, give its consent? Certainly contempt is not too 
strong a word to describe this sort of posture toward the fate of a large 
multiethnic, multifaith empire that straddled Europe, Asian Anatolia, and 
the modern Middle East. As Bismarck himself summarized his Ottoman 
policy in October 1876, “the question as to whether we can come to an 
agreement on the Oriental rough-and-tumble with England, still more 
with Austria, and most of all with Russia, is for the future of Germany 
infinitely more important than Turkey’s treatment of its subjects and its 
relations with the European powers.”7 Or as he notoriously told the Reich-
stag just two months later, “the entire Orient is not worth the bones of a 
single Pomeranian grenadier.”
Unattractive as all this may seem to modern sensibilities, Bismarck’s 
Ottoman policy contained much good sense. It was not that Bismarck 
wished Turkey, or Turks, ill. Even as he was sounding out Disraeli on ways 
in which the powers might agree on partitioning the Ottoman Empire, 
the chancellor told Britain’s ambassador to Berlin that “he did not agree 
with those who said: ‘Things are too bad to last so any longer’; in his 
opinion Turkey might yet be kept together with a little good-will.”8 The 
coldness with which Bismarck viewed the diplomatic chessboard left him 
immune to the fashionable anti-Turkish sentiments of the day. To Dis-
raeli’s own distaste, English public opinion was falling hard for William 
Gladstone’s famous pamphleteering against the Bulgarian Horrors. More 
ominously, the Russian press was concocting that dangerous blend of Or-
thodox Christian “Second Rome” messianism and pan-Slavic irredentism 
that convinced Tsar Alexander II that his throne would be in jeopardy if 
he did not do battle for “Christendom,” just as Nicholas II would later 
fatefully believe that he could not fail to mobilize his armies for Serbia and 
Slavdom in 1914. Bismarck, by contrast, remained largely unmoved by the 
drumbeat of anti-Turkish horror stories coming from Bosnia and Bulgaria. 
He saw easily through Russia’s efforts to invoke “Europe” and “Christen-
dom” to beatify its crude territorial ambitions in the Balkans, telling Kai-
ser Wilhelm I that any politician who used such abstractions to justify 
wars was not to be trusted. Significantly, Bismarck cited the Crimean War 
to illustrate his point, condemning in that case not the Russians but the 
“Western powers” (Britain and France) for having sold the conflict as a 
“European” crusade against Russian barbarism.9 Although hardly a paci-
fist, Bismarck believed fundamentally that “any war, even a victorious war, 
was a misfortune [ein Unglück]. It is always a dangerous game to deploy 
Beelzebub to drive out the devil.”10
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It was particularly dangerous when Russia played the role of Beelze-
bub. Bismarck’s worst strategic nightmare was that Germany would have 
to fight a war on two fronts against France and Russia. For this reason the 
generals in Berlin were gravely concerned any time Russia mobilized its 
army. A little-known aspect of the Ottoman crisis of 1877 is that in Janu-
ary and February, while Russia was mobilizing against Turkey, the Prus-
sian General Staff undertook intensive preparations for a two-front war. 
With strategic insight no less prescient than Bismarck’s diplomatic antici-
pation, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder drew up a mobilization timetable 
for knocking France out first before wheeling around to face  Russia, which 
was eerily similar to the modified Schlieffen Plan that his son, Moltke the 
Younger, would actually deploy in 1914. The great Moltke, like the great 
Bismarck, had the kind of wisdom born of a tragic sense of life, which led 
them to prepare for the worst-case scenario in order not to have to live 
through it.11
In an ideal world, Bismarck would rather that St. Petersburg had not 
intervened in the Balkan crisis —  or, even better, that the Bosnian and 
Bulgarian uprisings of 1875 and 1876 and the vigorous Ottoman response 
following the declaration of war by Serbia and Montenegro on June 30, 
1876, and the refusal of the Turks to buckle to European pressure the fol-
lowing winter had never happened, giving Russia cause to do so. Failing 
this, Bismarck would much have preferred that Disraeli mediate the bur-
geoning crisis himself —  after all, keeping Russian imperial ambitions in 
check had been a cardinal objective of British foreign policy for decades. 
But the British response to Bismarck’s overtures in this direction in 1876 
was “cool and dilatory.”12 Playing his own version of Realpolitik, Dis-
raeli was happy to watch from the sidelines. Why should a British prime 
minister be obliged to solve Bismarck’s Balkan dilemmas for him? In the 
end it would be up to the chancellor himself to navigate a path for Ger-
many between the treacherous shoals of Russian ambition and Austrian 
jealousy.
Short of Germany itself declaring war on St. Petersburg, Bismarck 
could have done nothing after Russia declared war on Turkey on April 24, 
1877, but wait and see what the clash of arms would bring. And nothing 
is just what he did. One of the strangest facts of the entire Balkan crisis 
is that the German chancellor who famously hosted the conference that 
brought it to a close was on sick leave from April 1877 to February 1878, 
ailing from his chronic neuralgia, rheumatism, shingles, and sleeplessness. 
Bismarck was effectively out of action, that is, for the entire duration of the 
Russo-Ottoman War. Whether he used ill health as an excuse to “hide” 
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and wait out the war or not, it was clear that he wanted no part of Russia’s 
“European” crusade.13
If Bismarck had first hoped the Balkan crisis would inject fresh new 
obsessions into European diplomacy to replace the stale Franco-Prussian 
antagonism, by the time the crisis came to a head in February 1878, with 
the Russian army at San Stefano (today’s Yeşilköy) and the British fleet 
poised menacingly in the Sea of Marmara, threatening to intervene if 
they marched on Constantinople, he was thoroughly weary of the whole 
thing. As Bismarck had told Lord Odo Russell following the collapse of 
the short-lived Constantinople summit that had preceded Russia’s decla-
ration of war in April 1877, “he never liked conferences, he never expected 
any useful result from them and as far as he was concerned he would never 
go to a conference again.”14
While Bismarck’s health had improved slightly by the time the diplo-
mats descended on Berlin that June, it is a telling commentary on his con-
dition that each day of the conference he had to force down “two or three 
beer mugs full of strong port wine” simply in order to “get his blood flow-
ing.” Bismarck in 1878 was almost a caricature of an Old World diplomat, 
world-weary, arrogant, largely inebriated, and yet still able to lead complex 
multinational negotiations in his own German and two foreign languages 
(mostly French but also English, as Disraeli did not speak French) simul-
taneously, while constantly avoiding the merest hint of sentiment about 
the matters under discussion. Above all, Bismarck insisted that the nego-
tiations be conducted speedily, with no time wasted on issues of less than 
general interest: his health would not permit them to drag on indefinitely. 
It is testament to the will of the iron chancellor that the conference was 
confined to only twenty sessions, lasting one month ( June 13 to July 13, 
1878).15
The contrast between Bismarck’s sublime indifference to detail and 
the passionate lobbying of the other diplomats was almost breathtaking. 
Count Gyula Andrássy, representing Austria-Hungary, moved heaven and 
earth to wrest Bosnia-Hercegovina from the Turks, whose own diplomats, 
Alexander Karatheodori Paşa and Sadullah Bey, sought desperately to sal-
vage some scrap of Ottoman Europe from the wreckage of San Stefano. 
It is largely a matter of taste whether Bismarck showed more contempt to 
Andrássy or Karatheodori. On Andrássy’s cozying up to Disraeli in order 
to win Balkan gains for Vienna hardly merited by Austria’s passivity, the 
chancellor memorably told Lord Salisbury: “I have heard of people refus-
ing to eat their pigeon unless it was shot and roasted for them, but I have 
never heard of anyone refusing to eat it unless his jaws were forced open 
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and it was pushed down his throat.” As Salisbury interpreted Bismarck’s 
latest bon mot, the chancellor’s objection was that “Andrássy insists not 
only that the Turk shall cede [Bosnia], but that the Turk shall beg him as 
a favour to take it. The poor Turks make a wry face.”16 As for the “poor 
Turks” themselves, the iron chancellor told an aide at one point that they 
were wrong to think that it would be advantageous for them if the confer-
ence broke off without result: whether it led to war or peace, “the powers 
will reach agreement at the expense of the Turks.” Still crueler was Bis-
marck’s aside following a minor incident in which his own (rather large) 
dog had growled at an unfortunate diplomat: “The dog has not finished 
his training. He does not know whom to bite. If he did know what to do, 
he would have bitten the Turks.”17
Despite appearances, however, the month-long Berlin conference 
of 1878 saw the first stirrings in Bismarck of a new posture toward the 
Ottoman Empire. To begin with, although the chancellor had at times 
seemed disrespectful of the Turkish delegation, according to Josef  Maria 
von Radowitz, director of Oriental Affairs at the Wilhelmstrasse, Karath-
eodori Paşa had won Bismarck’s grudging respect for the “tact and intelli-
gent posture” with which he had defended an impossible position at the 
conference.18 And it would be foolish to ignore Bismarck’s role in arrang-
ing the final Treaty of Berlin, which, of course, was far from unfavorable to 
the Porte, breaking up the “Big Bulgaria” of San Stefano into two roughly 
equal halves, one of which (Eastern Rumelia) was returned to Ottoman 
suzer ainty, along with Macedonia. True, along with Bessarabia the Rus-
sians gained Kars, Ardahan, and Batum —  the lost provinces of Elviye-i 
Selâse that so animated nationalist Turks in 1914, much as the French 
wanted Alsace-Lorraine back. But the Russian prize from the  diktat peace 
of San Stefano that Alexander Gorchakov and Peter Shuvalov wanted 
most to hold onto —  control of the Straits or at least unfettered access to 
the Mediterranean for Russian warships —  was firmly denied them. Al-
though this diplomatic defeat for St. Petersburg owed at least as much to 
British objections as to Bismarck’s machinations, in the coming years most 
Russian nationalists and pan-Slavists directed their venom at Bismarck, 
who in this case at least had proved as good a friend as the Turks could 
have hoped for.
Too much should not be made of these hints of a more pro-Ottoman 
stance on Bismarck’s part. Bismarck was not opposed per se to a partition 
of the Ottoman Empire among the European powers, so long as it could 
be arranged without provoking a European war —  but this seemed unlikely 
in light of the war scare of early 1878. Retaining Russia’s friendship, or at 
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least its lack of hostility, indeed remained a higher diplomatic priority for 
Bismarck over his last twelve years in office than relations with Ottoman 
Turkey. Many volumes have been written on the delicate balancing act 
between Austria and Russia involved in Bismarck’s revival of the Three 
Emperors’ League in 1881 and his concoction of the Byzantine Reinsur-
ance Treaty of 1887, and for good reason. It was a virtuoso performance in 
balance-of-power diplomacy, well worthy of the attention showered upon 
it by diplomatic historians.
It is not always understood, however, how central the Eastern ques-
tion remained to Bismarck’s European balancing act and how much 
his posture vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire shifted after the Congress of 
Berlin. It was not that his previous indifference turned into any kind of 
sentimental attachment to Turkey. Rather, the Porte’s ability to survive 
in the face of Russian aggression and European connivance impressed 
him. Once Russian resentment over the collapse of San Stefano had been 
temporarily put on ice by the renewal of the Three Emperors’ League in 
1881 —  which reaffirmed the ban on Russian warships entering the Straits 
and guaranteed Turkey’s borders against possible Bulgarian aggression in 
Macedonia, although leaving the door open for a possible union of Bulgar-
ian and Ottoman Eastern Rumelia —  Bismarck worked to build German 
influence at the Porte. It was an intriguing reversal when Radowitz, the 
man Bismarck had dispatched 1875 as special emissary to St. Petersburg 
charged with coordinating German and Russian policy regarding the 
Balkans, was appointed ambassador to Constantinople in 1882, this time 
charged with helping firm up Turkish defenses to ward off Russian aggres-
sion. Not coincidentally, this was the same year that Bismarck, upon the 
request of Sultan Abdülhamid II, authorized Gen.-Maj. Otto Kaehler’s 
military mission to Turkey (taken over after Kaehler’s death in 1885 by 
Lt.-Col. Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, with whose name the venture is 
usually associated). Bismarck wrote on one of Radowitz’s reports that this 
mission would provide Germany “with influence and informants” in the 
Ottoman Empire.19
Bismarck had good reasons for the shift in Ottoman policy. The 
 balance- of-power maneuvering that he had engaged in during the Balkan 
crisis of 1875–78, by which he sought to supervise a peaceful multipower 
partition of the Ottoman Empire, had been needlessly complex and had 
ultimately failed to prevent a dangerous war. Although Russia had nearly 
taken Constantinople in 1878, the effort had clearly exhausted its forces. 
A repeat performance was not soon in the cards, as borne out by Russia’s 
humiliation in the Bulgarian crisis of 1885–87, in which Russia failed to 
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intervene even after its officers and advisors were recalled owing to in-
subordination by its ungrateful protégé Prince Alexander of Battenberg, 
who had been placed on the throne by his own uncle, Tsar Alexander II. 
Austria, meanwhile, had shown an appetite for Turkish territory far larger 
than its waning military strength warranted. Rather than encouraging pre-
tensions of a sweeping partition of Turkey in Vienna and St. Petersburg, it 
would be far simpler for the Germans to shore up the Ottoman Empire in 
order to ward off Russian temptation and thereby prevent a great power 
conflagration.
As noted above, Bismarck would ideally have preferred that the British 
play this role, as they had in the past. By the early 1880s, however, it had 
become painfully evident that this would not happen. Although he had 
dispatched the fleet in 1878, just in time to prevent the Russian conquest 
of Constantinople, Disraeli had pointedly refused to take up the Balkan 
baton that Bismarck had offered him back in 1876, when decisive British 
intervention could have prevented the Russian invasion that brought Eu-
rope to the brink of war. With the advent of the hysterically anti-Turkish 
Gladstone government in 1880 as well as its invasion and subsequent oc-
cupation of Egypt in 1882, Bismarck’s last hope was dashed. It was obvious 
that Britain would not soon return to its previous role as protector of the 
Porte against Russian encroachment.
While not quite subscribing to the later pan-German embrace of Tur-
key (“Not a pfennig for a weak Turkey,” Paul Rohrbach vowed in his clas-
sic primer on The Baghdad Railway, “but for a strong Turkey we can give 
everything!”),20 Bismarck made it clear that he would no longer easily ac-
quiesce in the destruction of the Ottoman Empire by any power that eyed 
it covetously. This included not only Austria and Russia but also Britain: 
at the height of the “Great Game” war scare in April 1885 a special German 
commission was created to revamp Ottoman shore defenses and if neces-
sary mine the Dardanelles, in case the British fleet sought to attack Russia 
via the Black Sea.21 Crowning the new fortifications would be state-of-
the-art German artillery, purchased from Mäuser & Lowe, Schichau, and 
especially Krupp, which sent 440 cannons to Turkey in 1886 alone. Most 
of the guns reinforced shore batteries at the Bosphorus and Dardanelles; 
several were also installed on land at the Çatalca lines outside the capital.22
It is true that Bismarck made gestures in the opposite direction toward 
St. Petersburg, most notably in the Reinsurance Treaty of June 18, 1887, 
which included a hidden clause promising German neutrality in case the 
Russian tsar “judged it necessary” to dispatch a Russian fleet to “protect 
the entrance to the Black Sea [e.g., through the Bosphorus] and thus to 
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safeguard Russia’s interests.” It should be emphasized, however, that this 
was a “very secret” protocol, designed more to appease Russian suspicions 
than to commit Germany to any course of action.23 Like the offers to Dis-
raeli that the chancellor had put on the table prior to the Russo-Ottoman 
War of 1877, the Reinsurance Treaty cost Bismarck nothing: he was of-
fering things (such as a Russian right of intervention in the Straits) that 
were not really his to give. Only the chancellor himself, of course, knew 
which was the “real” Bismarck: the one who was quietly helping the Turks 
strengthen their Straits defenses or the one who was (even more quietly!) 
promising not to object if the Russians tried to seize the very same Straits.
While no one can possibly pretend to know what such a complicated 
man truly believed in his heart of hearts, on balance the evidence suggests 
that Bismarck was probably more sincere in his efforts to strengthen Ger-
man influence in Turkey than in purchasing Russian loyalty with specious 
promises of blanket neutrality. As Herbert von Bismarck, the chancellor’s 
son, who was Germany’s state secretary from 1886 to 1890, interpreted the 
Reinsurance Treaty with a dose of his father’s arch-cynicism: “it should, if 
matters become serious, keep the Russians off our necks six to eight weeks 
longer than would otherwise be the case.”24 From the German perspective, 
the treaty was mostly about France and Russia, not Turkey: the clause 
about Russian naval intervention at the Straits was thrown in at the special 
insistence of Russia’s foreign minister, Nikolai Girs.25 If Russia did try to 
seize the Straits by force, after all, German opposition (or acquiescence) 
would hardly matter: the Turks would defend the Bosphorus as best they 
could (unofficially helped by German military advisors). If they held out 
long enough, the usual coalition of powers not wishing to see Russia con-
trol Constantinople would coalesce, doubtless including both Austria and 
Britain. And all this presumed that the Russians would actually try to 
seize the Straits, which its current limited naval and amphibious capabil-
ity in the Black Sea rendered virtually impossible.26 Bismarck’s promise 
of neutrality in case of an operation that had such a small chance of ever 
occurring does not tell us much about his real views on the matter.
Against these largely symbolic promises to the Russians, we must set 
Bismarck’s real, if largely unpublicized, gestures indicating a commitment 
to the defense of the Ottoman Empire. Under the able hands of von der 
Goltz “Paşa” (an honorific given to him in 1895, after ten years’ service to 
the sultan), the Ottoman army was thoroughly reorganized along Euro-
pean and especially German/Prussian lines in the 1880s. The empire was 
divided up into seven military districts, each assigned a separate numbered 
army that handled conscription in the area. The first section of reserves 
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(redif ) was also structured along German lines to match the organization 
of the regular army, to make them ready for absorption into the army dur-
ing wartime. A kind of national or home territorial guard (the Müstafiz) 
was added to this, with an extended service term for draftees. All Ottoman 
army and guard units were better armed now too: not only with Krupp 
heavy guns but with “hundreds of thousands of modern Mauser rifles,” 
which replaced the outdated inventory with which the Turks had tried 
to hold off the Russians in 1877–78. Perhaps most importantly, von der 
Goltz introduced rigorous officer-training protocols in Turkey, assigning 
German instructors to the Ottoman Harbiye Academy and sending the 
most promising Turkish officer-students to the German war academy in 
Berlin.27
In its first significant conflict following the reforms of Kaehler and 
von der Goltz Paşa, the 1897 war with Greece, the Turks performed excep-
tionally well, defeating the Greeks decisively at Domokos (Dömeke) and 
advancing as far as Thermopylae by May. From there, Edward Erickson be-
lieves, the Ottoman army commanded by İbrahim Ethem Paşa could, “in 
all likelihood, have pushed on rapidly to Athens.”28 That it did not do so 
was due entirely to European (particularly Russian) diplomatic interven-
tion. It was an ironic turnabout from 1878: this time it was the victorious 
Turks who were forced to stand down under pressure from concerned out-
side powers rather than the seemingly unstoppable (but in fact exhausted) 
Russians. Still, buttressed by the German-led military reforms inaugurated 
under Bismarck, the Porte had its first real military-diplomatic victory in 
four decades (much, much longer if we discount the Turks’ Crimean War 
“victory,” which owed so much to Britain and France), gaining a small 
part of Greek Thessaly and forcing Athens to pay heavy reparations. Few 
could have foreseen such a rapid recovery of the Ottoman position after 
the humiliation of 1877–78.
A little-known factor contributing to the Turkish victory over Greece 
in 1897 was the use of the German-built Anatolian railway to transport 
troops from eastern Turkey to the western front. It is true that German in-
vestment in Ottoman rail had lain dormant for much of the period when 
Bismarck was in office, following the completion of the Istanbul-İzmit line 
in 1872 under the supervision of the Swabian railway engineer Wilhelm 
von Pressel, known to posterity as the “Father of the Baghdad Railway.” 
But this was the natural result of the Ottoman bankruptcy of 1875, which 
dashed the hopes of Pressel and others that the Porte would be able to 
finance construction of a line to Baghdad or Basra, on the Persian Gulf, 
across the sparsely inhabited semidesert plains of Anatolia, two forbidding 
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mountain ranges (the Taurus, north of Adana, and the Amanus range, 
which guarded the entrance to the Hatay and Syria), and the malarial wet-
lands of Mesopotamia. In the 1880s German engineers and moneymen 
had rediscovered the dream of a Baghdad railway, just as von der Goltz was 
helping revive the Ottoman army. After Georg von Siemens of Deutsche 
Bank gave Sultan Abdülhamid II an emergency loan of 30 million marks 
in 1888, the Anatolian Railway Company was formed on March 4, 1889.29 
Within three years the Istanbul-İzmit line had been extended to Ankara, 
which greatly accelerated the Turkish mobilization in 1897.30
The key to Bismarck’s Baghdad railway policy, like the von der Goltz 
military mission, was inconspicuousness. If we trace the early history of 
the Baghdad railway concessions, it is remarkable how little attention they 
received —  outside St. Petersburg of course, where Russians viewed them 
with predictable foreboding.31 The completion of the İzmit-Ankara exten-
sion between 1889 and 1892, although entirely the work of the German-
dominated Anatolian Railway Company, was in fact largely financed by 
bond issues in the City of London (although the Germans did later buy 
out the British shares), which helped camouflage German intentions.32 
This was classic Bismarckian policy: quiet, gradualist, inexpensive, and in 
no way alarming to the other powers. So unconcerned were the Russians 
about German investments in the Ottoman Empire that St. Petersburg 
itself requested renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890.
Of course, Bismarck’s Byzantine pact was not renewed that sum-
mer —  Kaiser Wilhelm II had finally pushed the chancellor out of office 
in March 1890, and the new chancellor, Leo Caprivi, found its terms not 
so much offensive as beyond his capacity to understand. The speed with 
which German foreign policy was transformed after this watershed event 
has sometimes been exaggerated: the Franco-Russian alliance targeting 
Wilhelmine Germany with Bismarck’s nightmare of a two-front war was 
not fully ratified until 1894 —  and even then Berlin remained on fairly 
good terms with London, if not so much with St. Petersburg. When it 
came to Turkey, nothing of substance changed on the surface: the von der 
Goltz mission remained in place, and the Anatolian Railway Company 
continued work on the İzmit-Ankara extension.
In terms of style, however, a tremendous revolution had taken place in 
Germany’s posture toward the Ottoman Empire. In November 1889 the 
new emperor Wilhelm II (who, at thirty, was then Bismarck’s junior by 
fifty-four years) —  over the stout objections of the iron chancellor —  had 
made a grand state visit to Constantinople, falling in love with the city and 
Ottoman Turkey more generally. Taken into confidence by Sultan Abdül-
hamid II, who cleverly told the impressionable young Kaiser that “his visit 
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would make the other powers nervous,” Wilhelm II began imagining him-
self as the champion of beleaguered Turks against bullying Europeans.33
Just nine years later the German emperor made an even more famous 
grand tour of Asiatic Turkey, where he memorably pledged himself to 
protect Turks —  and Muslims —  everywhere. Wilhelm declaimed that 
summer in Damascus with dramatic flourish: “May the Sultan and his 
300 million Muslim subjects scattered across the earth, who venerate him 
as their Caliph, be assured that the German Kaiser will be their friend for 
all time.”34 Thus was born Hajji Wilhelm, as the Kaiser was sometimes 
called due to his pose as global protector of Ottoman (and even Persian 
and Indian) Muslims against the hostile predations of the Christian colo-
nial powers. Britain, France, and Russia all ruled over millions of Muslim 
subjects —  the Raj alone counted nearly 100 million. Not surprisingly, dip-
lomats of the powers soon to coalesce into the Triple Entente were thus 
greatly alarmed by the Kaiser’s speech in Damascus. The Kaiser seemed to 
have substituted the gushing enthusiasms of a diplomatic amateur hour 
for Bismarck’s posture of cool and calculated indifference toward the 
Ottoman Empire.35
It was a new age in German diplomacy, and not only in the person of 
Wilhelm II. Succeeding the subtle Bismarck fils as state secretary in March 
1890 was Adolf Marschall von Biberstein, who, in a sign of Germany’s new 
foreign policy priorities, would be appointed ambassador to Constanti-
nople in 1897 —  a post he would hold for another fifteen years. Marschall, 
unlike Bismarck’s man at the Porte (Radowitz), made no effort to hide 
his partiality for Turkey —  or, more precisely, for Germany’s primacy of 
position in Turkey: not for nothing did he become known as the “Giant 
of the Bosphorus.” Marschall, backed by Kaiser Wilhelm II, made very 
clear his support for the sultan following the bloody Armenian uprisings 
of 1894–96, even as diplomats from the other powers were unanimous in 
condemning Abdülhamid II. In August 1896 the Kaiser even sent a signed 
photograph of himself in public celebration of the sultan’s birthday, just as 
everyone else in Europe was condemning the Kaiser’s friend as “the bloody 
Sultan” or “Abdul the Damned.”36 Meanwhile, whereas Radowitz and the 
two Bismarcks had ever so quietly signed off on German military missions 
and declared that the Anatolian Railway Company would receive no of-
ficial support from Berlin, Marschall declared quite openly in 1899, on the 
eve of the fateful signing of the first Baghdad Railway Convention:
To extend the railway from Haydar-Pasha to Baghdad.. .to build 
this line with only German materials and for the purpose of bring-
ing goods and people to [Asia] via the most direct path from the 
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heart of Germany.. .will bring closer the day when [Bismarck’s] 
remark about the entire Orient not being worth the bones of a Po-
meranian Grenadier will seem like a curious historical memory.37
A more emphatic repudiation of Bismarckian Ottoman policy could 
scarcely be imagined.
A brief glance at the particulars of the Baghdad Railway Convention 
signed in December 1899 indicates just how serious the German commit-
ment to the Ottoman Empire —  and the Hamidian regime —  now was. As 
early as June 1898 Abdülhamid, through his ambassador to Berlin, had de-
manded that the Germans share intelligence on revolutionary opponents 
of his regime and be ready to deport specifically named “agitators” from 
Germany on request. In the years following the awarding of the Baghdad 
concession in 1899, the Kaiser’s spies duly provided the Ottoman sultan 
with regular reports on the whereabouts and activities of his “Young Turk” 
opponents. In return, Abdülhamid had secretly agreed to give German 
prospectors working for the railway company generous exploration rights 
inside his domains, including copper and coal mining grants and broad 
excavation rights within twenty kilometers of the Baghdad line on either 
side. A secret Ottoman imperial irade (decree) dated November 15, 1899, 
further gave the Berlin Museum rights to keep artifacts that German 
 miners and archaeologists might discover while excavating on Ottoman 
territory. The results were dramatic, as anyone who has visited the Museum 
Island in Berlin knows. Finally, the Baghdad Railway Convention of 1899, 
unlike the Anatolian Railway Company chartered a decade earlier in Bis-
marck’s last year in office, required a substantial and open-ended German 
financial commitment —  beginning with a straight-up bribe of 200,000 
Turkish pounds (then worth $1 million, the contemporary equivalent 
of over $100 million) deposited directly into the Ottoman state treasury 
by Deutsche Bank. Poor old Bismarck (who had died the previous year) 
would have rolled over in his grave if he had learned of this.38
With the one-two punch of the Kaiser’s Damascus speech of 1898 and 
the sweeping Baghdad Railway Convention of 1899, the die was essen-
tially cast for the (still unofficial) German-Turkish alliance: the Kaiser and 
the sultan were now bound together against the rival European  powers, 
for better and for worse. So strong was the relationship that not even the 
Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the fall of Abdülhamid after the 
Otuzbir Mart Vakası (the counterrevolution of April 13, 1909, which led 
to the sultan’s deposition following a Committee of Union and Progress 
[CUP] countercoup) could dent it. In ironic testimony to the undimin-
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ished power of the colossal new German Embassy atop the hill of Taksim 
in the era of Marschall, the Giant of the Bosphorus, Abdülhamid’s secret 
police chief İzzet Paşa would seek refuge there from the mob during the 
Young Turk Revolution of July 1908, even as the Speaker of the CUP-
dominated parliament, Ahmed Rıza, sought refuge in a German Baghdad 
Railway Company building during the Otuzbir Mart Vakası.39 Another 
sign of the enduring strength of the relationship between Berlin and Con-
stantinople was the playing out of the controversial “Armenian reform” 
campaign of 1913–14: Marschall’s successor, Hans von Wangenheim, kept 
the Ottoman grand vizier, Said Halim Paşa, informed on everything the 
Russians were up to. Although the Germans ultimately agreed to go along 
as part of a general compromise to cool tensions over the “Liman von 
Sanders affair” (which broke in November–December 1913), Wangen-
heim left the grand vizier in no doubt that Russia was behind the Arme-
nian reform campaign and that Germany was going along only to keep the 
peace. Viewing the campaign as essentially a Russian plot, Wangenheim 
pointedly demanded that Russia’s ambassador, Mikhail Girs, personally 
insist that the Turks agree to controversial points, such as the appoint-
ment of European inspectors in the six eastern “Armenian” provinces, so 
that the Germans themselves could escape Turkish opprobrium. As Girs 
complained to Wangenheim on October 17, 1913, “it would be dangerous 
if we alone had to make this demand, as then all of Turkey’s exasperation 
would fall exclusively on us [Russians].”40 Due to German insistence, the 
final terms of the reform agreement ratified in February 1914 did not even 
mention “Armenians” or “Armenian provinces,” as both the Russians and 
Armenian activists pointedly complained.41 On this as on nearly every 
important issue facing the Ottoman empire, Germany remained much 
closer to the Porte than the other powers, as borne out by the signing of the 
Turco-German wartime alliance on August 2, 1914 (after Vienna, London, 
and Paris had all turned down Turkish alliance offers).42
 The romance between Wilhelm II and Ottoman Turkey is oddly 
appealing, even allowing for the hiccup in 1908–9 in which his friend 
Abdülhamid was replaced by the pseudo-constitutional regime of the 
Young Turks. The Kaiser’s famous social awkwardness, born in part of 
an inferiority complex due to his withered left arm (a legacy of a difficult 
birth that his mother barely survived), lends a kind of pathos to his fit-
ful and ultimately doomed efforts at visionary statesmanship. It is hard 
not to sympathize with the efforts of Hajji Wilhelm to champion Turkey 
and the Muslim world, even if his understanding of Islam was necessar-
ily deficient. Compared to Bismarck’s cynicism and gestures of outright 
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contempt  toward Turkey and Turks, the Kaiser’s earnest love affair with 
the Ottomans is far more attractive to modern sensibilities.
Whether the interests of Germany —  and Turkey —  were better served 
by the Islamophilia and Turcophilia of the Wilhelmine era than by Bis-
marck’s cold Realpolitik is a very different question. Historians have long 
speculated about the prospects for European war and diplomacy had Bis-
marck remained in office longer, with the obvious counterfactual being 
better relations with Russia (thus preventing the two-front war night-
mare) and England (no “Krüger telegram,” no German naval program, 
thus no Entente Cordiale in 1904 and no Anglo-Russian Convention in 
1907 to crown the Franco-Russian alliance as a Triple Entente). Of course, 
the iron chancellor was a ripe old seventy-five when finally pushed from 
office in 1890 and lived only another eight years, with his ever-precarious 
health declining rapidly all the time. After a reign in power lasting nearly 
thirty years, it is hard to imagine that Bismarck’s successors would have 
kept all of his policies: surely the Kaiser himself was not alone in wanting 
meaningful change. The von der Goltz mission and the Anatolian Rail-
way Company had already pointed the way to a more pro-Turkish line 
in Berlin by the time Kaiser Wilhelm II pushed the chancellor out of of-
fice, Bismarck’s Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 notwithstanding. It is hardly 
surprising that these policies took on new meaning in a post-Bismarck 
era, particularly after the Kaiser’s own appointees (like Marschall at the 
Constantinople Embassy) began promoting them.
If it is clear that Bismarck’s careful Realpolitik could not have endured 
unaltered, however, this does not mean that things needed to turn out the 
way they did, with Germany foolishly provoking its own encirclement — 
and helping push the Ottoman Empire into World War I. The key to any 
sensible foreign policy in a multipolar world, as Bismarck understood, is 
balance. Taking the enmity of France for granted, the goal of his diplo-
macy following German unification in 1871 was to postpone a Franco-
Russian rapprochement for as long as possible, to reverse the legacy of 
the Crimean War. An essential corollary to this policy was to prevent a 
serious clash between Austria and Russia over dividing up the Ottoman 
inheritance in the Balkans, which might tip Europe into a general war 
that could only end badly for Germany, surrounded as it was by jealous 
neighbors. To stave off an Austrian-Russian clash, it was fine for Germany 
to help Turkey shore up its defenses against possible encroachment —  but 
only so long as the policy did not tip over into outright partiality for Tur-
key against Russia, which would push St. Petersburg into the nightmare 
alliance with France. Had the Reinsurance Treaty been renewed in 1890, 
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had the Kaiser refrained from his ostentatious embrace of Islam (with its 
implied rebuke of the other European powers as Christian oppressors of 
Muslims), had Marschall not insisted that the Baghdad Railway Com-
pany be so exclusively German, the Franco-Russian alliance might never 
have come into being. Once it did, Germany had no way of escaping the 
dreaded pincers of a two-front war when the inevitable Ottoman or Bal-
kan “accident” occurred. Bismarck may or may not have sincerely cared 
whether or not the Ottoman Empire survived long into the twentieth 
century, but his policies, by postponing Europe’s Armageddon, gave it a 
much better chance of enduring than did the Kaiser’s reckless romanti-
cism. Wilhelm’s repudiation of Bismarckian diplomacy led inexorably to 
the German tragedy of 1914–18 and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire 
in the wake of Germany’s defeat.
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